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Copp: Official History in the 1990s

Terry Copp
Bill McAndrew, Donald E. Graves, and Michael Whitby, Normandy
1944: The Canadian Summer (Montreal: Éditions Art Global
Inc., 1994), 164 pages, $39.95.
Bill McAndrew, Bill Rawling, Michael Whitby, Liberation: The
Canadians in Europe ((Montreal: Éditions Art Global Inc.,
1995), 170 pages, $39.95.
Bill McAndrew, Canadians and the Italian Campaign, 1943-1945
(Montreal: Éditions Art Global Inc., 1994), 167 pages, $39.95.
[All books distributed by Vanwell Publishing, St. Catharines, ON]

W

hen the Department of National Defence
decided to publish a series of books to
mark the anniversaries of Vimy, Dieppe and
D-Day no expense was spared. Hardcover,
9x12, full colour editions were designed by Art
Global and published in both official languages.
Anyone with experience in publishing knew
that really big bucks were involved in producing
these titles yet initially little attention was paid
to promotion or distribution. Historians outside
the National Defence establishment were of
course envious - the budget for one of these
books would have financed a dozen scholarly
books - but government decisions have never
been easy to understand.

Vimy, the first title in the series and Dieppe,
Dieppe were beautiful, expensive rehashes of
a familiar material reflecting the point of view
of the author, Ben Greenhous. When Normandy
1944: The Canadian Summer, published in
1994, appeared all eyes were f o c u s e d on
Normandy b u t the book had little impact
presumably because the series was now viewed
as an exercise in public relations for DND.
Despite my own i n t e n s e i n t e r e s t in the
Normandy campaign and my respect for the
senior author, Bill McAndrew, I gave it little
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more than a glance when it came in for review
and no one else expressed any interest in
commenting on it.
In 1996 Canadians and the Italian
Campaign was p u b l i s h e d . I r e a d Bill
McAndrew's account of the struggle in Italy
with interest. No one knows more about this
subject than McAndrew and an overview by a
serious scholar was long overdue. The book is
very well written and the illustrations, except
for the maps recycled from the official history,
are outstanding. The introduction offers a good
discussion of Allied strategy and Canadian
p r e p a r a t i o n . McAndrew draws u p o n his
knowledge of battlefield psychiatry, 1st Division
personalities and the work of Canadian war
artists and historians to enliven the text. The
use of diaries and letters to convey a first-hand
impression adds to the feeling that we are
coming into direct contact with the soldiers'
experience of war.
McAndrew's account of the battle for Sicily
is familiar in outline but exceptionally rich in
new detail. His chapter on Ortona is simply
the best account we have of that dramatic
confrontation. We are first reminded of the
paradox of offensive operations in Italy which
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could only be justified as a means of holding
German divisions away from France. As Sir
David Hunt, Alexander's Chief Intelligence
Officer put it "failure was the means by which
the Allied Armies in Italy succeeded in fulfilling
their strategic purpose."

of Canadian and British operational and
tactical doctrine. No similar analysis of the way
Germans fought the battle is offered so the
reader is left with the picture of the Allies
overcoming the clever and resilient enemy with
"Brute Force."

"Ortona" is followed by equally powerful
chapters on "The Liri Valley" and "The Gothic
Line." In both essays McAndrew's sympathetic
approach to the Canadian experience provides
new insight. Especially noteworthy is his
explanation of the dismissal of LieutenantGeneral E.L.M. Burns. McAndrew notes, "His
misfortune was ironic considering that the
Gothic Line operation was one of the most
notable if unheralded Canadian Corps actions
of the war. "

I enjoyed Normandy 1944 and learned from
it. There is much in the book which is new
though the interpretative framework is very
traditional and the need to cover complex
issues in a few paragraphs produces serious
simplifications. The chapters on August 1944,
while adding some neat detail to the store of
published accounts ignores the strategic and
operational context within which decisions
were made reinforcing the image of a bumbling
Canadian army.

Having profited from reading one book I
decided to revisit Normandy 1944 which
McAndrew wrote with Donald Graves and
Michael Whitby. The format, a well written
narrative of events spiced with first person
accounts is similar but the navy also gets its
share of space. Michael Whitby, a brilliant
young naval historian lost to the Directorate
in the r e c e n t downsizing, c o n t r i b u t e s a
marvellous chapter on "Canada's War at Sea"
and adds new material on aspects of "Neptune."
McAndrew's interest in the impact of war upon
soldiers is evident throughout but especially
in his chapter "Young Men in Combat."

Consider the treatment of the 89th and
85th infantry divisions which arrived in
Normandy on 5 and 10 August respectively.
Both were fresh, well equipped divisions with
their own engineers, artillery and self-propelled
assault guns backing six full strength infantry
battalions. J u s t before "Totalize," 89th Division
took over Verrières Ridge with one regiment
occupying Tilly, Rocqancourt, Fontenay and
May and the second in reserve south of the
ridge. If the Canadians and 51st Highland
Division destroyed an entire division on 8-9
August and then smashed 85th Division a week
l a t e r does it say a n y t h i n g a b o u t t h e i r
effectiveness in "Totalize" and "Tractable"? If
the German infantry divisions were not totally
destroyed does it help to explain where the
battlegroups which blocked our advance to

Normandy 1944 contains solid accounts of
the July battles with moving human interest
stories. It also offers a sophisticated critique
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Trim came from? Relying on the self-serving
accounts of German officers to picture the other
side of the hill is never a good idea. Normandy
1944 should be read by specialists as well as
beginners. It is a serious and challenging work.
Liberation: The Canadians in Europe is less
successful. The decision to cover the entire
post-Normandy campaign in Northwest Europe
in 100 pages of text presented a real challenge
and since Michael Whitby was joined by Bill
Rawling to share the writing with McAndrew
there is both tactical air and naval history to
be included. The attempt to describe the
strategic debate of September 1944 relies
almost entirely on views expressed after the
failure at Arnhem and leaves the reader with
the impression that the authors know that
alternate courses of action not followed would
have been more successful. Someday someone
will have to explain why sealing off the Beveland
Isthmus in September, assuming it could have
been done, would have led to an earlier opening
of the port of Antwerp. If 15th Army was
"trapped" would t h a t not have made the
c a p t u r e of Beveland, Walchern a n d the
Breskens pocket more difficult? Of course, 15th
Army would probably have continued north to
Schouwen and Tholen if Woensdrecht was
occupied but either way the approaches to
Antwerp would still be under German control.
The operational story, which is told with
heavy reliance on first person accounts, is
much more interesting and original but there
are problems with the selection of "primary"
sources. Charlie Forbes was a superb combat
soldier but his memoirs, for all their colour,
are not entirely free of dramatization and his
account of the Walchern Causeway is a good
example. Donald Pierce's Journal of a War
provides insight into the mind of a one veteran
writing a self-consciously literary memoir years
after the events. Explorations of the construction
of memory in the aftermath of the Second World
War will make good use of such sources but they
should not be confused with the events of 1944.
McAndrew's i n t e r e s t in battlefield
psychiatry is evident in his account of the
a f t e r m a t h of the Scheldt battle and the
discussion of the reinforcement problem which
follows is worthy of a separate scholarly article.
It is quite simply one of the most thoughtful, best

balanced discussions of the problem yet in print.
The authors also found room for long neglected
ancillary units including field engineers and the
Ordnance Corps. Their account of the RCAF role
includes Flight Lieutenant Richard Audet's
journal for 29 December 1945 when he became
the only pilot in Second Tactical Air Force to shoot
down five enemy planes in one day.
Chapter IV "Seaward" is devoted to the navy
and RCAF squadrons in Coastal Command.
Whitby focuses his story on the 75 RCN vessels
that served in European waters including 29th
and 65th RCN Motor Torpedo Boat Flotillas
which were actively involved in the battle to
open the port of Antwerp. The account of the
operations of HMCS Sioux described as a
"capable ship that has never received the
attention it deserves" will be of interest to
everyone as will the description of the sinking
of HMCS Guysborough. Let us hope Michael
Whitby is able to continue to play his part in
the writing of the RCN's official history.
Chapter five "Rhineland" and six "Finale"
are brief overviews which work well as
interpretive essays but once again the balanced
and reasoned critique of Canadian generalship
a n d d o c t r i n e is not p a r a l l e l l e d by any
commentary on the actions of their opponents.
If German senior c o m m a n d e r s knew the
realities of battle better than their Canadian
counterparts it did not stop them from ordering
near suicidal counter attacks. The authors might
have used Corps and Army Intelligence reports
which provide contemporary d o c u m e n t s ,
translated from the German, portraying the
growing demoralization of the German army
under the impact of the Allied offensives.
These three books, as well as the recently
published volume on the battle of the Atlantic
are distributed by Vanwell. Priced at $39.95
they are not cheap but at a minimum you
s h o u l d b u y Canadians and the Italian
Campaign and Normandy 1944, you won't
regret it.
Terry Copp is the Editor-in-Chief of
Canadian Military History and the
author of numerous books and articles
on the Canadian army in the Second
World War.
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